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Search Subsidies vs Hiring Subsidies: 





In a two-sided search model, where the matching function is 
characterized by ex post match-specific heterogeneity and variable 
search intensity, the relative perform ance of search and hiring sul>- 
sidies in term s of both  cost effectiveness and aggregate efficiency is 
assessed. Conditions for cost effectiveness to  be obtained are de­
fined for both  instrum ents. A com putational exercice shows th a t 
search subsidies tend to  be more efficient than  hiring subsidies, 
specially in term s of underemployment.
*1 am grateful to Prof. Ramon Marimon for supervision. I also would like to thank, 
without implication, my colleagues at the European University Institute, specially 





















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
Unemployment benefits have become a prominent institution in Euro­
pean countries. However, they are accused of creating disincentives to 
job search and therefore of increasing the length of unemployment spells. 
Empirical studies1 have found a positive relation between the degree of 
persistence of unemployment and with the duration for which unemploy­
ment benefits are payable. The perverse effects of unemployment benefits 
are present also on the demand side of the labor market2. Unemployment 
benefits make firms more reluctant in hiring new employees because of 
the negative effect they have on equilibrium reservation values, reducing 
firms return from extra hiring. The abolition of unemployment compen­
sation would certainly remove both the search disincentive and the hiring 
disincentive effects. However, it may also introduce some other kind of 
inefficiencies, specially in the presence of imperfections in other markets 
or of externalities. If agents are risk-averse and financial markets sire in­
complete, i.e. borrowing is either limited or exogenously precluded, un­
employment benefits become an efficient insurance scheme against idio­
syncratic risk, as shown in Flemming [7]3. Moreover, as shown in Wright 
[29], unemployment benefits may be socialized via the electoral process, 
even if insurance technologies are available in the economy. In Marimon 
and Zilibotti [16], unemployment insurance allows workers to spend more 
time in looking for the most suitable job. The misallocation of resources 
to mismatch is subsequently reduced when a skill-biased technological 
change is introduced.
These two facts lead to unambiguous policy recommendation: search 
and/or hiring incentives have to be restored within an unemployment in­
surance scheme, so as to reduce existent inefficiencies without introducing 
new ones.
In Easley, Kiefer and Possen [6], both the relative and joint perfor­
1 See Bean [1],
2See, for example, Blanchard and al. [2].
3In Hansen and Imrohoroglu [8], these efficiency improvements are mitigated when 



























































































mances of unemployment insurance and negative income tax systems arc 
assessed. Wright [29] finds that unemployment benefits should decline 
with the duration of unemployment. Hopenavn and Nicolini [9] look at 
the features of an optimal unemployment insurance contract, in an envi­
ronment where the probability to find a new job depends on the search 
effort made by the agent. In this model the principal (e.g. the govern­
ment) does not observe workers’ search effort. The authors first, find, like 
Wright [29], that the level of unemployment benefits should be a decreas­
ing sequence. Second, the tax rate after re-employment should increase 
with the length of the unemployment spell. The latter unemployment 
insurance and tax schemes are efficient in terms of search incentives but 
may have mitigated results if adverse selection is taken into account. Pis- 
sarides [23] demonstrates how progressive income taxes can be used to 
offset the search disincentive effects of unemployment insurance. Such 
taxes have to be coupled with a search subsidy when the search effort 
is not fixed but perfectly observable. In this taxation framework, high- 
paying jobs become less attractive exerting downward pressure on the 
reservation wage. Indeed, progressive income tax lowers the expected re­
turn of employment, and thus discourages the unemployed from search­
ing. Ljungqvist and Sargent [13] explore the role of search incentives in 
explaining the various unemployment experiences of European welfare 
states. They assess the effects of a progressive income tax scheme on 
the national product and unemployment rates. Their modelling exhibits 
a trade-off between a higher search effort and aggregate efficiency. By 
introducing some kind of government control over the unemployed, they 
are able to explain how low unemployment can be coupled with generous 
unemployment policies.
Labor subsidies are instruments able to fit the above policy rec­
ommendation. Labor subsidies are thought to be the right stimulus to 
employment inflow4. They are an active employment policy, in the sense 
that they aim at stimulating employment5. A peculiar form of labor
4See CEPR [4], chapters 7,8.
5The implementation of Active Labour Market Policies is highly recommended by 




























































































subsidies are the so-called employment vouchers. They differ from other 
general employment subsidies in the sense that they are paid only to 
unemployed workers. To all intents and purposes they act as a mar- 
ginal employment (or, more strictly, hiring) subsidy for an unemployed 
worker. Thus, persistence in unemployment can be curbed, as it is com­
monly recognized that the probability of being retained is larger than the 
probability of being fired. In addition, employment vouchers are thought 
to be an appropriate way of dealing with market failures that lead to 
excessive real wages rind thereby depress the labor demand. They are an 
efficient instrument for reducing labor costs regardless of the source of 
such excessive costs6. Employment vouchers are subsidies for hiring un­
employed workers, and they can be implemented through a wide variety 
of policy instruments. It is generally argued that they may be indiffer­
ently granted to employers and employees. In practice, they principally 
correspond to targeted subsidies, that is, only particular groups of un­
employed are provided with, and are generally cashed in by the employ­
ers. There is little “empirical" evidence about the effects of employment 
vouchers on search intensity. Woodbury and Spielgelman [28] and Dubin 
and Rivers [5] have made some experimental estimates of the impact of 
wage subsidies and of search bonuses7. One of their main results is that 
both of the previous policies have a positive impact, but upon different 
segments of the labor force. In Orszag and Snower [21], the potential 
short-run and long-run effect of vouchers on employment are analyzed 
within a partial equilibrium set up. Deadweight and displacement effects 
are introduced together with a specific governmental budget constraint 
such that no net cost is imposed on tax payers. They use a two-state 
Markovian process to characterize the employment opportunities, and 
both hiring and firing probabilities are functions of the voucher level. 
The optimal level of voucher to be ascribed is positively correlated with 
the level of benefit and negatively linked to the dead weight and dis­
placement costs. This optimal level corresponds to both short-run and
6See Snower [26] for an extended discussion of the purpose.





























































































long-run improvements in the level of employment8. However, incentives 
compatible schemes can not be assessed in tliis kind of framework.
In this paper employment vouchers take the form either of a search 
subsidy ( interpreted as a search bonus) paid to the unemployed worker 
once she has found a job, and decreasing with the length of the un­
employment spell9, or of a hiring subsidy cashed in by the firm once a 
new worker has been hired. Both instruments affect agents’ decisions 
and consequently equilibrium values. In particular, search subsidies may 
stimulate at the first place search effort, as found in Dubin and Rivers [5], 
and hiring subsidies the hiring willingness of firms. It is also clear that 
more intensive job search is unable to create new jobs on its own while 
hiring subsidies may. However, in terms of the Beveridge curve, which 
relates vacancies to unemployment, a larger search effort may shift it in. 
Indeed, both the shape and the position of the Beveridge curve are in­
fluenced by the search behavior of the unemployed. For many European 
countries a shift-out of the curve has been observed10. Therefore, a higher 
level of job search may help to recover a lower rate of unemployment as 
much as hiring subsidies may stimulate employment.
The approach is to build an equilibrium search model, with stochas­
tic job matchings and variable search intensity, so as to imitate the em­
ployment law of motion and to assess welfare indicators. I first attempt to 
identify a trade-off between lower unemployment, and cost effectiveness 
and/or aggregate efficiency, and then to assess the relative performance 
of the two policy instruments in terms of this trade-off11. Conditions 
for cost effectiveness to be obtained exist for both instruments. Never­
8This is the first attempt to look at the dynamics of targeted labour subsidies. 
The literature has focused so far largely on comparative statics, as in Snower [27].
9This scheme is similar to tax scheme presented in Hopenayn and Nicolini [9]. 
However, unemployed workers perceive it not as an income threat but rather as an 
income bonus.
10See OECD [20].
u As only risk neutral agents are considered, the benefits from risk sharing will 
not be captured. However, as gains from risk sharing do not contrast with gains 
from improved search and/or hiring incentives, I will still be able to conclude that 





























































































theless, instruments are expected to lead to contrasting results in terms 
of aggregate efficiency. In particular hiring subsidies expected to reduce 
reservation values while search subsidies are expected to increase them. 
The computational exercise shows that hiring subsidies tend to dampen 
aggregate efficiency more than search subsidies do, making the above 
trade-off to large to be socially viable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the benchmark economy. Steady state and optimum conditions 
for the policy augmented economies are shown in section 3. Section 4 
presents some sufficient conditions for cost effectiveness to be obtained, as 
well as the corresponding optimal values of policy instruments. Section 5 
considers efficiency and aggregate welfare indicators. Section 6 contains 
the computational strategy followed to find steady state values. It also 
presents the calibration of the model and the computational results. The 
final section concludes.
2 T h e B en ch m ark  E con om y
2.1 T h e  Labor M arket
There are many ex-ante identical workers and many ex-ante identical 
firms, and each operates as an atomistic competitor. Workers are either 
unemployed or brought together with a firm by a job-matching tech­
nology. Unemployed workers are searching for jobs at a positive cost 
and firms are recruiting through vacancy creation. Frictions arise in the 
economy because, ex-post, the productivity of a job-worker pair is a ran­
dom drawing from a probability distribution </(«) known by both agents. 
However, once contact between the firm and the worker is made, the 
productivity of the match is known with certainty. There is an ex-post 
match-specific heterogeneity. This is referred to as stochastic job match­
ings. Workers are assumed to be separated from jobs following a Poisson 
process with rate denoted s. Firms decide whether to open or not a va­




























































































choice variable, the reservation productivity o r below which neither the 
firm nor the worker will want to trade. Matching occurs at the aggregate 
level, at a rate (1 — G (nr)) M  (cu,v), where u is unemployment and ru 
can be defined as the ’’efficiency units” of searching workers. The match­
ing technology M  (cu, v) has the standard properties. It is assumed to be 
increasing in both its arguments, concave, and homogenous of degree 1 . 
Let us define the v:u ratio as the labor market tightness and let us denote 
it by 0. The process that changes the state of vacant jobs is Poisson with 
rate
q{0, c, aT) =  (1 — G(or ))m( — , 1) ( 1)
v
The representative unemployed workers12 move into employment 
according to a Poisson process with rate
p(0,c,ar) = (1 -  G(ar))m(c,0) (2a)
p and q are related by p(0,c,aT) = 0q(0,c,ar). Both p and q are 
increasing in an exogenous rise in c, and decreasing in an exogenous rise 
in a r.
At the steady state equilibrium, the flow into unemployment is 
equal to the flow into employment, that is
s(l — u) = 0q(0,c,ar)u
Thus, assuming that the labor market is large enough so that devi­
ations from the mean can be ignored, the rate of unemployment is given
by
s +  6q(0 ,c, a r)
12The transit ion probability of worker i in unit time is given by p,(0, c,, o rl) =  




























































































L can be interpreted as the time that the typical worker will spend 
unemployed over an infinite working life. Indeed, as s is the exit rate 
from employment and 9q(9, c, aT) is the rate at which workers transit 
from unemployment to employment, the representative worker's unem­
ployment history is a Markov chain where u is the ergodic probability of 
unemployment.
2.2 F irm s
We assume that firms are small and each has one job that is either vacant 
or occupied by a worker. When the job is occupied the firm produces 
output ay, where y is a fixed value as we assume that labor is the only 
production factor. When it is vacant, the firm is actively engaging at a 
cost ywe where we is the average wage in the economy. Firms return a 
worker at a rate equal to the transition rate for vacant jobs. Let V  be 
the present discounted value of expected profit from a vacant job and ,1 
the present discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job. At 
steady state, V  and J  satisfy
rV  — - y w e +  q(9,c,ar)(Je -  V) (4)
r J  = a y —w + s(F  — J)  (5)
Following Pissarides [24] the zero-profit or free entry condition 
V  = 0 is made in order to close the model. The latter condition means 
that vacancies adjust instantaneously to eliminate pure profits or losses 




There is a reservation productivity a j  such that all a h > a  j  are 
accepted. The reservation productivity of the firm is defined by condition 




























































































a f ij -  wf  =  0 (")
Taking the conditional expectation of (5) and introducing (6) we 
obtain the condition for jobs




2 .3  W orkers
We are interested in the behavior of the representative worker. In equilib­
rium all unemployed workers search with the same search intensity noted 
c. It is further assumed that unemployed workers undertake their own job 
search, supplying their own hours. Time available is normalized to unity. 
Hence, the leisure time available to the unemployed worker is 1 — h (c) 
where h! (c) > 0 and h" (c) > 013. The imputed value of leisure time to 
the worker is set proportional to the after-tax wage rate. Income during 
unemployment is then given by v  [1 — h (c)] (1 — tb)we, where i/ > 0 and 
i/' ■< 0. In the theoretical derivations that follow, we assume for conve­
nience, and without any loss of generality, that h" (c) =  0 and i/' =  0. 
Unemployed workers also receive some unemployment benefits p(l — tb)we 
of non limited duration14. Thus, the valuation placed on unemployment 
is given by
rU  =  (v [1 -  h. (c)] + p)(l -  tb)we + p(0, c, ar)(Ee -  U) (9)
Taxation is proportional and the tax rate is chosen such that, at 
equilibrium, tax revenue covers expenditures on unemployment benefits. 
That is
13c will lie on an interval [0, cmax] such that /i(cmax) < 1.
14Setting hiring cost, leisure valuation, and unemployment benefits proportional to 
the expected wage has no strong economic rationale. However, it has no consequences 
in terms of qualitative results, compared to expected wage independent specifications 





























































































p( 1 -  tb) U = t (1 -  (/) (10)
The net worth of being employed is given by
rE  =  (1 — tb)w + s(U — E) (11)
where again s is the exogenous separation rate.
rU represents the permanent income of an unemployed worker, that 
is, the minimum compensation that an unemployed worker requires to 
accept a job offer. This corresponds to the definition of the reservation 
wage, the minimum wage that an unemployed worker would accept.
wT - rU ( 12)
From equation (9) and conditional expectations of (11) we obtain
that
Wr =  [(r + s ) H l  -  h(c)] + p] +?>(<?, car)](l -  tb) 
we r + s + p(0,c.,ar)
Provided that the condition < 1 is satisfied, standard p a rtia lOLL'r U'e 7 *
comparative statics are verified. Under this assumption an exogenous 
rise in the right-hand side of equation (13) raises the reservation wage. 
That is, replacement ratio p raises the reservation wage while search cost 
reduces it.
The First Order Condition for c is given by
t i {c)v[\  -  h(c)} (1 — ^ [1 — h(c)] -  p)p(0 ,c ,aT) 
r  +  s + p(0, c, a r) c (14)
The left hand side represents the net loss of extra search effort, 
while the right hand side represents the discounted net gain of extra 
search effort. As usual, the replacement ratio affects negatively search 
effort. The tax rate does not appear in the above equation as it affects 
identically both net income from work and the share of labor in the 




























































































2 .4  W ages
The equilibrium wage is derived from a Nash Bargain between firms 
and workers when they meet. It maximizes the weighted product of the 
worker’s and firm’s net return from the job
max (E  -  U f { J  -  Vr)1_<i
s . t E  + J - U - V  = S
Where S  stands for the surplus of the match. Search cost and un­
employment benefits are proportional to the average wage in the economy 
at that monrent in time. The wage offer a particular unemployed worker 
may get has no effect on the average net worth of unemployment.
The First Order Condition for w gives
That is,
E ~ u  = ~ v ) (15)
By imposing the equilibrium condition V  =  0, and by substituting
(9) and (11) into the left hand side of expression (15), (4) and (5) into 
the right hand side, we obtain the equation for the average wage
we
(iofy






























































































It is now straightforward to define equilibrium conditions. The equilib­
rium unemployment is defined by equation (3). The reservation produc­
tivity is obtained by substituting wr and wc from equations (13) and (1C) 
into equation (7) and is given by
Qv _ P (M 1 -  ft(c)] + p )( l -  tb)(l -  P) + (IQ-y
« e i - n \ p { i - e i ) - { i - ( } ) { v l i - h { c ) ]  +  p - i ) ]  ( ’
Assumption < 1 implies that < 1 is verified. Again, a
rise in the right-hand side will raise the reservation productivity. Hence, 
the replacement ratio will raise the reservation productivity implying that 
in this framework it becomes a shift variable in the relationship between 
v and u.
The tightness condition is obtained by introducing expression (16) 
into the jobs condition (8)
(1 -  /?)(! -  v[l -  Me)] ~ P) -  PO'y-
(r +  s) 
q(6,c, a r)P i  =  0 (18)
Using the outcome of the Nash Bargaining, the condition for opti­
mal search effort is
ch! (c) i/' [1 -  h. (c)] =  Y ^ j j lO  (19)
The system is recursive. Equations (17), (18) and (19) give the 
steady state values for aT, c, 6. With knowledge of these variables equa­
tion (3) gives the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Moreover, by dif­
ferentiating equations (18) and (19) with respect to the reservation pro­
ductivity we find that the effects a r has on them cancel each other out, 






























































































Figure 1: Equilibrium search intensity and tightness
solved for 6 and c. As represented in 1 , uniqueness of equilibrium is en­
sured by constant returns in the job-matching technology together with 
’’input-augmenting” search intensity.
In a (u, v) space, equation (3) gives the so called Beveridge curve 
or UV  curve. As it is usually assumed in the theoretical literature, we 
assume here that the effects operating through the probability to make a 
contact, namely the search effect and the vacancy effect dominate the ef­
fect operating through the rejection of a job offer, namely the reservation- 
wage effect. Because of this assumption, which has found strong empir­
ical support15, and because of the assumed properties of the matching 
function the UV curve is downward sloping and convex to the origin. 
The ” production side” of the economy is represented by the so-called VS  
curve, hinging on equation (29). By setting 9 =  and by introducing 

































































































which is certain to be satisfied for values of r  small enough.
3 P o licy  In stru m en ts
We consider two policy instruments apart from unemployment benefits 
and wage taxes paid by the worker in order to finance the policy, namely 
search subsidies and employment subsidies. Search subsidies are cashed 
in by the worker once she has accepted an offer. Hiring subsidies are 
paid to the firm for each new worker it hires. These two instruments 
would have equivalent qualitative effects within a framework where search 
intensity is hold constant and matching is not stochastic. However, when 
the theoretical framework is enriched by assuming that search intensity 
can vary and matching is assumed to be stochastic, then, as will be shown 
below, it makes a difference to whom the employment subsidy is paid.
3.1 Search Su bsid ies
Actual search subsidy is defined by
p(0,c,ar) \ ( l - t , ) w ‘ (20)
Actual search subsidy is then increasing in search effort as the tran­
sition rate is increasing in search effort.
Search effort is not perfectly observable. Hence, from a practical 
point of view, search bonuses are conceivable only if they take the form 
of a lump sum transfer. However, search effort affects directly the length 
of unemployment spell, which is perfectly observable by governmental 
authorities. Indeed, in all the European countries, unemployed workers 
have to register at an unemployment agency in order to draw unem­
ployment compensation. Thus, in the above economy, the longer they 
stayed unemployed the smaller the voucher they receive. If unemploy­
ment compensations are provided only for a finite period of time, a policy 




























































































the unemployed worker who finds a job before the expiration date of the 
compensation payment, to cash in, as a lump sum bonus, the amount of 
unemployment compensation she would have been paid if she had stayed 
unemployed for the all duration of benefits.
The permanent income expression becomes
By comparing equation (14) with equation (23), the introduction of 
search subsidies leads to a higher level of search intensity, holding other 
variables constant.
3 .2  H iring Su b sid ies
Subsidies are paid to the firm for each new worker it hires. Actual hiring 
subsidy can be expressed as
( 22)
For < 1,search subsidy increases the reservation wage.
The condition for optimal search is now given by
[1 -  v  [1 -  h (c)] -  p -  p(f), c, « r )A] p(9, c, ar)
r + s +  p(0,c, a r) c
(23)
q(0, c, a r)ewe (24)




























































































rV  = - ( 7  -  q(0,c,ar)e)wc + q(0,c,ar)(Je -  V) (25)
The condition for jobs is now
aey — we — (r + s) (7 ~ <l(0,c ' (*r)e)*ue
<7(0, c, a r) =  0 (26)
Hiring subsidies are different from wage subsidies in the sense that 
they are a ” one-shot” paiement and affect at the first place the return 
from fifing a vacancy rather than the return from a job match. As we will 
see in the next subsection, hiring subsidies will affect positively tightness 
in a partial equilibrium analysis.
3.3 E quilibrium  w ith  P o licy
The average wage resulting from Nash Bargain is given by
e ________________________ flaeV________
[0(1 “  (07 “  p(0,c, ar)e)) -  (1 -  0) (is [1 -  h (c)] + p + p(9, c, aT) \  -  1)]
(27)
The equilibrium condition for unemployment has the same expres­
sion than in the previous section. Conditions for reservation productivity, 
tightness and, search intensity are now given by16
0  ̂ _  0 [u [1 -  h (c)] + p + p \  (c)] (1 -  t,'h) ( 1 - 0 )  + /?(#7 -  pe)
ae 1 -  0 [0 (1 -  (07 -  Pe)) - { \ - 0 ) { y [ \ - h  (c)] + p + pX -  1)]
(28)
( l - f } ) [ l - v [ l - h ( c ) ) - p - p \ \ - l 3 ( 9 1 - p e ) - £ ± £ / 3 ( 0 ' y - p e ) = 0
P
(29)
l6The system of equations presented below contains both of the policy instruments. 




























































































ch'(c)i/  [1 -  h (c)] -  p{0, c, n r)A =  (fl-y -  p(0, c, o r)c) (30)
Again, the system represented bv equations (28), (29) and (30) is 
recursive, and again (29) and (30) can be solved uniquely for 0 and r. 
Partial equilibrium comparative statics are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Partial Equilibrium Comparative Statics
c 0 Qr We
s + + + +
e - + - -
If we now turn to general equilibrium considerations, search sub­
sidy stimulates search at the first place. However, as it compensates for 
the search cost of the unemployed worker, it is going to make her more 
selective in terms of job acceptance. Search subsidy might then raise 
worker’s reservation productivity. These two elements have a contrast­
ing effect on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. In 
terms of trade externality, more search will be interpreted as a positive 
one by firms. Their willingness to open up new vacancies is bigger. Nev­
ertheless, firms might be reluctant in doing so if the negative effect on 
the worker reservation productivity is too important.
As mentioned previously, hiring subsidy affects tightness condition 
at the first place by reducing the cost of opening up a vacancy. This 
will also stimulate search as tightness and search are positively linked 
because of the positive externality that a rise in tightness represents to 
searchers. Nevertheless, hiring subsidy tends to lower the firms’ reser­
vation productivity and subsequently, as shown by equations (28) and 
(27), to reduce both the equilibrium reservation productivity and equi­
librium wage. The latter effect discourages workers from searching more 
as the return from extra search effort is smaller. It is true that a lower 




























































































return from extra search is reduced. As it is clear from equation (30), 
we might end up at equilibrium with a higher tightness level, but. with a 
lower search intensity.
In terms of 1 search subsidies make both the c (ff)and the 0 (e) 
curves flatter and shift down, while luring subsidies make them steeper 
and shift up. Hence some further conditions are needed in order to define 
precisely changes in search and tightness equilibrium values. This is the 
scope of subsection 4.2.
In a (u, v) space, a possible outcome of the introduction of one of 
the two policy instruments here considered is shown in figure one. The 
UV  curve shifts in while the V S  curve shifts up. Both tightness and 
vacancy rate raise while unemployment is reduced.




























































































4 C ost E ffectiven ess
4.1 T h e B u d g et C onstraint
The definition of conditions for cost effectiveness to be obtained is nec­
essary to assess the relevance of the two policy instruments presented 
previously. The budget constraints for search subsidies and hiring subsi­
dies are respectively
(p +  ps(0,c ,a r)A)(l -  ta) u, =  t, (1 -  us) (31)
{p{ 1 -  th) + ph(0,c,ar)e)uh =  th (1 -  uh) (32)
The subscripts introduced in the above equations refer to the par­
ticular equilibrium values obtained in the two different policy schemes. 
Subscript s holds for the search subsidy scheme, and subscript h for the 
hiring subsidy scheme. The absence of equilibrium wage w in the above 
equations is due to the assumption that no exogenous public expendi­
tures have to be financed. It is obvious that in the presence of exogenous 
public expenditures the wage rate would play an important role in terms 
of cost effectiveness.
It is straightforward to isolate U, i = s, h, and then to compare its 
expression with the expression of the equilibrium tax tb rate found for 
the benchmark economy. We obtain that





and tb > th if
Ph > P
P~{Pb + ps) e
(34)
If we look at the relation between the transition rate and the policy 
instrument, obtained by strictly equating the left hand side with the 




























































































> 0 and > 0 for A lying on the interval [o, ^  [and that, > 0 
and > 0 for e lying on the interval [(), (pbP̂-^ [* 17-
P roposition  1 : If some conditions exist, such that at equilibrium the 
transition rate is positively affected by the introduction of a policy instru­
ment, then cost effectiveness is obtained for some positive values of the 
policy instrument.
4 .2  T h e  T ran sition  R a te
In general, the effect of any parameter z on the worker’s transition rate 
is given by
d6q(6, a T, c) (1 -  q{0,aT,c) 96 l dc g (oy) <9«r \
— —  = {------e------*  + »(*.«..■=);* -  TTg k ) a r j ’9
(35)
The three effects contained in the above expression are respectively 
the vacancy effect, the search effect and the reservation-wage effect. As 
mentioned previously the first two operate through the probability to 
make a contact while the last one operates through the rejection of a job 
offer. By assuming that contact elements dominate the rejection element 
of the transition rate, and if conditions under which both and have 
the same positive sign can be determined, it is then possible to state cost 
effectiveness for a policy instrument scheme.
From previous analysis it is possible to concentrate on equations 
(29) or equivalently equation (23) and (30) to solve uniquely for 0 and c. 
Using the implicit function theorem, ^  > 0 is verified if
p ( l  -  P)9 +  [(1 -  Tj(0,ar,c))(r  + s) -  p] 7 I dp 
P (1 -  0) 0 + [(1 ~ /?) (r +  5) -  p] 7  dc
________ (36)
17In what follows, we will only consider policy instruments lying on the respective 
intervals presented here above. Out of these intervals discontinuity matters would 
have to be taken into account without adding much to our analysis.




























































































The term into brackets in the LHS of the above expression has to 
be positive. This is likely to happen for value of /3 and 7 not too large. 
Condition (36) may be interpreted in the following way. As long as the 
additional cost of extra search that an unemployed worker faces, which 
means a lower wage claim, is higher than the additional wage cost that a 
firm would face if 6 increases, search subsidy raises equilibrium tightness 
and equilibrium search18
If Hosios’ efficiency condition19 is verified the latter term is equal 
to 1 and condition (36) reduces to
' (1 -  h (c)) > (38)
oc
This is the condition for the LHS of equation (30) to increase when 
search subsidy is introduced.
P roposition  2 : If condition (36) is verified then search subsidy will 
have a positive impact on both search and tightness at equilibrium. By 
assuming that, referring to the transition probability, contact elements 
dominate the rejection element, search subsidy will increase the transition 
rate from unemployment to employment.
Similarly, > 0 is verified if
(r + s) 7
[(1 -/3 )







ch'{c)v' (1 — h (c); 
(39)
l8See appendix 1 for details.
19When variable search intensity and stochastic job matchings are introduced sep­
arately, the standard Hosios’ condition for efficiency holds, namely
0 = y{O,c,ar) (37)
When taken together, as shown in Pissarides [24] chapter 7, the efficiency condi­





























































































The interpretation of condition (39) is similar to the interpretation 
of condition (36) in the sense that as long as the return from higher 
tightness is higher than the cost in terms of equilibrium wage, search 
will respond positively to hiring subsidy and subsequently equilibrium 
tightness20.
P roposition  3 : If condition (.‘19) is verified then hiring subsidy will, 
have a positive impact on both search and tightness at equilibrium. By 
assuming that, referring to the transition probability, contact elements 
dominate the rejection element, hiring subsidy will increase the transition 
rate frvm unemployment to employment.
4 .3  O ptim al V alues
In terms of cost effectiveness, the major effect for search subsidy will be 
observed when, in a (p, A)space , the slope of the curve characterizing 
equation (33) is equal to (35). For hiring subsidy a similar condition 
exists in the (p, e) space.
If condition (36), respectively condition (39), is satisfied, in addi­
tion to the assumption made previously, namely the dominance of the 
rejection element by the contact elements of the transition rate, and to 
the constant returns of scale assumption, a concave relationship corre­
sponding to (35), starting from the point characterizing the benchmark 
steady state, will be obtained in a (p, z)space, z = X,e. Tliis guarantees 
that the optimal level of A, in terms of cost effectiveness, will be lying on 
the interval [(), , respectively that the optimal level of e will be lying
on the interval [o, }'VbPfJ,̂  ] •
The optimal level of search subsidy and hiring subsidy are given 
respectively by
(40)p(0,c,aT)




























































































Figure 3: Cost effectiveness and Optimal values
and
, ^ c 1/2 -  ( X ^ ) ^ ) 1/a)
C' /2{p(0,c, a r) + sp)
(41)
where C = + V(0,ar, c ) l g 9( ° r )1— Cr’(ttr) ÔZ
If what stated previously is verified, we need no additional condi­
tions for these optimal values to be positive.
P roposition  4 : If condition (36), respectively condition (39), is satis­
fied, it exists some optimal positive value of search subsidy, respectively 
hiring subsidy, in terms of cost effectiveness. These values are given 
respectively by expressions (40) and (4 1) and are lying on jo ,^ j , respec-
tw dy





























































































The optimal value corresponds to the level of policy instrument that, 
corresponds to the higher value of p that can be obtained controlling for 
cost effectiveness. It does not unnecessarily correspond to the lowest tax 
rate.
5 E fficiency A n a ly sis
5.1 P ro d u ctiv ity  D istr ib u tio n  and A g g reg a te  Effi­
c ien cy
Productivity distribution is given by
The above expression computes the number of new matches with 
productivity less than or equal to a  at any point in time. It is straight­
forward to check that Dt integrates to one.
Using the fact that a  is a non negative random variable, the average 
or expected productivity, conditional on job acceptance at a point in time 
is given by21
Because labor is assumed to be the only factor of production in the 
economy, the Gross National Output corresponds to the average output
p(9, c, oy) [G(oy) -  G(min(oy, a))J 
p{9,c, a r) [1 -  G(ar)]
(42)
(43)
21A more straightforward but strictly equivalent definition of the expected produc­
tivity conditional on job acceptance is given by
« C “  [1 -  G (o)| da 




























































































times the employment level. GNP is adjusted for the disutility of unem­
ployed workers’ search for jobs and weighted by the tax rate in order to 
evaluate fully cost effectiveness. Hence, at equilibrium, it is given bv
GNP<ulj = (' ' V{1t U) -  uh (<:) (1 -  t)w  (44)
This measure of GNP allow an absolute assessment of the relative 
performance of the policy instruments considered in the previous sections.
6 C om p u ta tion a l E x erc ise
6,1 C om p u tation a l S tra teg y
In order to get a tractable closed form solution for optimal c. and a, 
and for equilibrium 9 and u, some parameterization can be introduced. 
In addition, this would help us in providing ’’quantitative” results. In 
our calibration exercise, the parameters of the model are r,p,t,e,  the 
distribution </(.) and the functions rn(.) and A(.).
The solution algorithm is obtained through the following steps22:
1.Solve system of equations (3), (17),(18) and (19) for stationary 
values of a r,c,9 and u.
2.Solve for the stationary productivity distribution for the station­
ary values obtained in 1 .
з. Iterate on steps 1 and 2 in order to reach a balanced government 
budget given respectively by equations (31) and (32).
и, v and w are respectively the equilibrium unemployment rate, the 
equilibrium vacancy rate and the equilibrium wage. A guess for the 
equilibrium tax rate t is made, and then step one is followed. If the 
government is found to be running a surplus (deficit) as an outcome of 
step 1, the tax rate is lowered (increased), and steps 1 and 2 are repeated 
until a balanced budget is achieved





























































































In this section I present the outcome of numerical resolution of the model 
with calibrated parameters. This exercise only aims at quantifying the 
various trade offs presented in the pervious sections. The parameters 
are chosen such that ’’plausible” results are obtained in the benchmark 
economy. A time period of unit length is interpreted to be one quarter. 
The interest rate is set equal to 0.015, implying an annual interest rate 
of 6%. The separation rate is fixed at s — 0.04, corresponding to an 
average duration of a job of slightly more than six years. This relative 
high figure becomes realistic once we take into account that quits and job- 
to-job movements are not considered in the economy. The replacement 
ratio is set equal to 0.4. As I assume they are provided for an infinite 
period of time unemployment benefits have to be given a broad definition 
that may also include any kind of welfare transfers. This explains the 
relatively low replacement ratio taken for computations. The matching 
technology is Cobb-Douglas, M  =  k(cu)a vl~a, and a is fixed at 0.62!, 
and k - 0.67. I assumed that the imputed value of leisure time was 
proportional to the wage rate. In the computations I assume that the 
imputed income is linear in leisure time with coefficient equal to 0.8. 
The search cost function is increasing and convex in the search level, 
that is h(c) =  (6.c)£, where b is set equal to 0.1 and e is set equal to 
1.3. The equilibrium value of c will then lie on the interval [0,10]. The 
hiring cost parameter 7 is fixed at 0.3. The productivity distribution 
g (.) is exponential with mean equal to 1. The maximum value that a  
can take is 8. It is easy to check that it corresponds to a value for which 
G(a) is only slightly different from 1. The exponential function is log- 
concave. Log-concavity, as shown in Burdett[3] implies that the hazard 
rate rises with an increase in job availability. This guarantees that both 
search and hiring subsidies will increase transition rate p and lower the 
expected duration of unemployment. In terms of equation (35), the right 
hand side has positive sign. Finally, ft is set equal to 0.6 in order to satisfy 
condition (20). This is done in order to avoid any bias that inefficiency, 23




























































































in terms of trade externalities, could exacerbate once policy instruments 
are considered.
6 .3  R esu lts
Two general observations can be formulated. The first one is that cost 
effectiveness and higher aggregate efficiency, as expected, are obtained 
for some values of both search and hiring subsidies. The second one is 
that both policy instruments can have a strong positive effect on the level 
of unemployment24. However, this occurs at a high cost, in particular 
under the hiring subsidy scheme, in terms of both cost effectiveness and 
aggregate efficiency.
A more detailed analysis of table 2 tells us that search subsidies 
tend to stimulate search, to raise tightness and to lower the equilibrium 
reservation productivity while hiring subsidies tend to raise tightness and 
to lower both search and reservation productivity ( see figure 1). Lower 
reservation productivity levels observed under the search subsidy scheme 
reveal that, in this particular calibration, workers tend to accept a larger 
cost in terms of leisure time than the transfer they cash in. As the 
latter is cashed in only once a successful contact has been made, em­
ployment becomes relatively more rewarding than unemployment when 
compared to the benchmark economy conditions. This occurs despite 
the fall in the equilibrium wage. Hiring subsidies affect strongly reserva­
tion productivity. Tightness’ increase does not stimulate search enough 
in order to compensate for the dampening effect that lower reservation 
productivity has on search. For large values of A and e (1.2 and 0.65 
respectively) some perverse effects arise. Search intensity is lowered sud­
denly and reservation productivity rises under the search subsidy scheme, 
and tightness decreases suddenly under the hiring subsidy scheme. Un­
der the search subsidy scheme leisure becomes ” too subsidized” as search 
cost falls dramatically. Under the hiring subsidy scheme, hiring becomes 
too subsidized too. Vacancies jump ahead and the fall in search intensity




























































































becomes sharper compared with lower level of hiring subsidy. Tin' boost­
ing effect on hiring makes the fall in equilibrium wage less pronounced as 
well, making unemployment worth higher than for lower levels of subsidy.
If we now turn to results contained in table 3, optimal values for A 
and e, in terms of cost, effectiveness, can be set respectively at 0.3 and 0.1. 
At this ’’optimum”, equilibrium values are sensibly different when com­
paring the two instruments. Unemployment is reduced bv almost 1.3% 
under the search subsidy scheme while it is reduced by almost 1.2% under 
the hiring subsidy scheme (see figure 2). Adjusted aggregate efficiency 
(gnpa) is 3% ahead with search subsidies and 2.5% with hiring subsidies. 
If we consider non-adjusted aggregate efficiency (gnp), improvement at 
optimal values of policy instruments are of same scale.
Once we do not control for cost effectiveness any more, then an 
important trade-off between unemployment and aggregate efficiency ap­
pears. In figure 3, crosses refer to ^  and dots to , where prime 
values indicate values obtained for a given policy instrument value and b 
subscript values refer to benchmark values. When the two lines go up con­
temporarily, both unemployment and aggregate efficiency are positively 
affected. This is true for some small values of both search and hiring 
subsidies. When the two lines move in opposite directions, a trade-off 
between unemployment and efficiency appears. This trade-off is more 
pronounced in the hiring subsidy scheme25. When both lines decrease, 
the perverse effects mentioned above appear. This is observed for rela­
tively large values of the policy instruments.
As for the equilibrium wage, it falls dramatically when hiring subsi­
dies are introduced. This is due principally to the downward effect hiring 
subsidies have on the reservation productivity.
In this computational exercise efficiency condition (37) holds. As 
the contact part of the transition rate is Cobb-Douglas, elasticity value 
is constant. This means that under both policy schemes, results are 
optimal in terms of efficiency. However, both policy schemes lead to un-





























































































dercmplovment, when new equilibrium values are related to benchmark 
ones. Underemployment is measured by the relative fall in reservation 
productivity which is more pronounced under the hiring subsidy scheme. 
Hence, subsidizing hiring tends to produce more underemployment than 
subsidizing search ms reflected by aggregate efficiency.
In the (u, v) space, the VS curve shifts up slightly and the UV curve 
shifts in under both policy schemes. Under the hiring subsidy scheme, 
the UV curve shifts in, as the shift-out effect of reduced search intensity 
is more than compensated by the shift-in effect of lower reservation pro­
ductivity. The VS curve’s shift is less and less pronounced when search 
subsidies are considered, as its slope is decreasing with the level of the 
search subsidy (see appendix 2). As for the slope of the VS curve, when 
hiring subsidies are considered, it is increasing (see appendix 2). Hence, 
we observe that the shift up of the later curve tends to be slightly more 
pronounced as the level of hiring subsidy increases.
In this computational framework, reservation productivity plays a 
major role in the sense that the impact it has on the transition probabil­
ity is larger than the impact of the two elements entering the matching 
function. This may be due principally to the particular form the distrib­
ution was given, namely exponential. As pointed out in the introduction, 
hiring subsidies can create jobs ”on their own” however jobs creation is 
biased toward unemployment and can not be fully completed if search 
behavior is not positively affected. It is also obvious that search subsidies 
are not able to stimulate jobs creation directly. However by stimulating 
search and then by increasing the subsequent trade externality, firms 
hiring willingness is stimulated indirectly. Hence search subsidization 
is able to improve job creation without dampening search behavior. It 
is also clear that the computational search environment chosen here is 




























































































7 C on clu sion
Targeted employment vouchers as defined in the Benefits Transfer Pro­
gram, first elaborated by Snower26, are usually attributed two major 
drawbacks, namely deadweight and displacement. The former refers to 
the fact that some vouchers are paid to employees who would have been 
employed without the existence of vouchers. The latter means that ei­
ther employed or unemployed workers who do not benefit from a policy 
scheme would be threaten in their status by unemployed workers bene­
fiting from the policy scheme. In existing policy schemes, like the UK 
Workstarts scheme, long term unemployed become attractive to firms 
compared to short term unemployed or employed workers. In the above 
sections, the framework adopted did not lead to heterogenous groups of 
unemployed workers at equilibrium. Unemployed workers have a single 
common feature at steady state which is to be unemployed. Search and 
hiring subsidies aim at preventing long term unemployment from occur­
ring, while BTP employment vouchers’type, at the first place, attempt 
to reintegrate long term unemployed workers into the active part of the 
labor market. Thus deadweight and displacement does not really have 
to be taken into account in assessing the relative performance of search 
and hiring subsidies.
Rather than in supplementary terms the two kinds of instruments 
have to be thought in complementary terms. On one hand search and 
hiring subsidies, considering that cost effectiveness and aggregate efficien­
cy’s gains are likely to be obtained ill both schemes, are potentially good 
instruments to deal the lack of both search and hiring incentives brought 
by unemployment benefits. In our computational exercise, search subsi­
dies are preferable in the sense that the trade-off between unemployment 
and aggregate efficiency and underemployment is less important than for 
hiring subsidies. On the other hand benefits transfers are a good way to 
allow long term unemployed workers to come back to work.
Previous sections have shown that search and hiring subsidies are 
good instruments, with a preference for search subsidies, to re-establish




























































































scaldi and hiring incentives and l>v consequence to curb unemployment. 
They are potentially cost effective and potentially aggregate efficiency 
improvers. These characteristics make them competitive tools when com­
pared to wage subsidies which are usually assumed to be very effective 
in terms of employment but either very costly or requiring some very 
specific and complex redistributive schemes.
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8 a p p en d ix  1
Applying the implicit function theorem to system of equations (29) and




























































































search subsidy and hiring subsidy respectively. The latter arc sufficient 
conditions.
For search subsidy, as the numerator of the implicit function for­
mula is always negative, that is its opposite is always positive, sign of ^  
relies on condition (36). Numerator’s opposite is given by
2 (1 - /? )  eh' (c) v' (1 -  h (c) ) +  A +  ^  + y
Moreover if condition (36) is satisfied, then from equation (30), jjj 
is necessarily positive.
This analysis can be pursued for hiring subsidy. Now opposite’s 
numerator is given by
ft2 f t*
JJZTff) (r  +  S +  P(0> C- “ r)) 7 -  J y T f t f ^ 6' C' ^
The above expression is always positive. % > 0 is verified, if con­
dition (39) holds. Again, it is easy to check from equation (30) that ^  
is necessarily positive.
9 a p p en d ix  2
The relation between the slope of the VS curve and the value of search 
subsidy is given by
vft-y 1 r + s
s (1 — u)
-  A
It is straightforward to see that the above expression decreases as 
value of A increases.
When hiring subsidy is introduced, this relation becomes
vft'y , v ( r  +  s) ft7  ( fts 
~ ^ + s { \ - u )2 + C J




























































































10 a p p en d ix  3
Computational Results
Table 2 c 0 «r V <1
B.E 2.8184 0.5392 1.1567 0.3065 0.5684
S.S:0.1 2.9955 0.5461 1.1557 0.3199 0.5857
S.S:0.3 3.3633 0.5628 1.1469 0.3505 0.6224
S.S.0.5. 4.3523 0.6269 1.1192 0.4387 0.6997
S.S:0.9 6.7273 0.8293 1.0124 0.7089 0.8548
S.S: 1.2 6.0931 0.743 1.0363 0.6242 0.8401
H.S:0.1 2.6747 0.5566 1.0151 0.3466 0.6227
H.S:0.3 2.3076 0.6299 0.7516 0.4338 0.6886
H.S:0.5 1.8045 0.8021 0.5483 0.5052 0.6298
H.S:0.65 1.1516 1.0644 0.4795 0.4629 0.4349
Table 3 a V w age gnp g n p a t
B E 11.54 6.22 0.1310 1.1045 1.1018 0.08
S.S:0.1 11.12 6.07 0.1295 1.1383 1.1356 0.078
S.S:0.3 10.25 5.77 0.1258 1.1348 1.1319 0.079
S.S:0.5 8.36 5.24 0.1256 1.0899 1.0866 0.084
S.S:0.9 5.34 4.43 0.1118 1.0747 1.0714 0.088
S.S: 1.2 6.02 4.47 0.1018 0.8942 0.8689 0.105
H.S-.O.l 10.35 5.76 0.1091 1.1309 1.1291 0.0792
H.S:0.3 8.44 5.32 0.096 1.0764 1.0753 0.085
H.S:0.5 5.88 5.88 0.0858 1.0177 1.0171 0.091
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